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ABSTRACT

This section, from a larger report describing a project designed to systematically investigate how religious and traditional values are represented in today's public school curricula, presents a critical evaluation of the two most discussed and influential models of moral education operating in the United States today. Both of these models have been developed in the last 20 years or so by education theorists at American universities and research institutes. The first model is known as "values clarification"; the other is based on the theory of moral development proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg. Additionally, a third and long-applied alternative, referred to as the "character education" model, is described. This alternative approach to teaching values has articulated such traditional moral aims as promptness, truthfulness, courtesy, and obedience. Whereas the first two approaches aim to shape patterns of moral reasoning, the final approach aims at shaping conduct. It is concluded that as American education revives its concern for basic disciplines, educators should also return to the direct and indirect teaching of morality found in the traditional model. (LH/AA)

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SECTION 2: PART 2

The Major Models of Moral Education: An Evaluation

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In Equity in Values Education: Do the Values Education Aspects of Public School Curricula Deal Fairly with Diverse Belief Systems? Final Report, July 1985 (SØ 016 857).

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The Major Models of Moral Education: An Evaluation*

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The initial section of this review presents a critical evaluation of the two most discussed and influential models of moral education operating in the United States today. Both of these models have been developed in the last twenty years or so by education theorists at American universities and research institutes. The first model to be considered is known as Values Clarification; the other is based on the theory of moral development proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg. In the last section we will describe a third and long applied alternative model, founded on more traditional approaches. This has been neglected by psychological theorists in recent decades though it has been continued to be applied in many public and private schools. This alternative model is now the focus of new and energetic intellectual concern.

Values Clarification: Model 1

General Character

This approach to moral education is due primarily to Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon in collaboration with several colleagues (see Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966, 1978; Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1973) and is known as Values Clarification. The model was first developed and published in the 1960s, while its widespread use in the public school system has come in the last 10 or 15 years (Simon et al., 1978, p. 18). Very generally, Values Clarification is a set of related procedures

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> designed to engage students and teachers in the active formulation and examination of values. It does not teach a particular set of values. There is no sermonizing or moralizing. The goal is to involve students in practical experiences, making them aware of their own feelings, their own ideas, their own beliefs, so that the choices and decisions they make are conscious and deliberate, based on their own value systems (Simon et al., 1978, back cover, also pp. 18-22; emphasis in original).

As this passage demonstrates, the Values Clarification approach is contrasted with the traditional explicit praising of virtue and condemning of wrong-doing. (These authors refer to this perjoratively as "sermonizing".) Simon and Raths reject as a hopelessly outdated any form of "inculcation of the adults' values upon the young" [sic]. (Simon et al., 1978, p. 15) Direct teaching of values is outdated, they say, because today's complex society presents so many inconsistent sources of values. Thus, it is argued, "Parents offer one set of shoulds and should nots. The church often suggests another. The peer group offers a third view of values. Hollywood and the popular magazines, a fourth... . The spokesman for the New Left and the counterculture an eighth; and on and on" (Simon et al., 1978, p. 16).

In the context of this confusing contemporary scene the developers of Values Clarification reject teaching morality. They also reject indifference to the problem of values, since a laissez faire position just ignores the problem and leaves students vulnerable to unexamined influences from the popular culture. Instead Raths and Simon et al. argue that what students need to know is a process. By using this process, students will be able to select the best and reject the worst in terms of their own values and special circumstances (Simon et al., 1978, pp. 18-22).

To enable young people to "build their own value system" Rath's system focuses on what is conceived as the "valuing process" (Simon et al., 1978, p. 18, 19) Valuing, according to Raths et al., is composed of seven elements which he presents in the following order:

CHOOSING one's beliefs and behaviors[2]

1. choosing from alternatives
2. choosing after consideration of consequences
3. choosing freely

PRIZING one's beliefs and behaviors

4. prizing and cherishing
5. publicly affirming, when appropriate

ACTING on one's beliefs

6. acting
7. acting with a pattern, consistency and repetition (Raths et al., 1966, p. 30)

Instead of particular values, the goal is to help students apply the seven elements of valuing to already formed beliefs and behavior patterns and to those still emerging. The Values Clarification theorists then propose classroom exercises designed to implement their process. The exercises, called "strategies," represent the major contribution of their recent writings. Before we can investigate these strategies, an analysis of their model and philosophy is needed.

The Psychological Critique

The psychological and, one should add, educational assumptions of the Values Clarification theorists are rarely presented and to our knowledge, never explicitly defended. But these premises are essential to the approach. Because of the neglect of any systematic treatment of these topics, it is difficult to disentangle the authors' assumptions from many of their normative statements, and ambiguously worded claims. Nevertheless, certain basic assumptions about human nature and education can easily be inferred from the model. At the center of Values Clarification is the concept of the self, with a corresponding emphasis on self-expression and self-realization. The way in which this psychological notion of the self is related to the educational

theory of the Values Clarification theorists has been nicely captured by the philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff. We will summarize his description:

> The fundamental theses are that each self comes with various innate desires and interests, and, motivation, that mental health and happiness will be achieved if these innate desires are allowed to find their satisfaction within the natural and social environment, and that an individual's mental health and happiness constitute the ultimate good for him. Such self-theorists [called maturationists by Wolterstorff] characteristically stress the malleability of the natural and social environments. . . What must be avoided at all costs, is imposing the wishes and expectations of others onto the self. Down that road lies unhappiness and disease.
>
> The proper goal of the educator, then, is to provide the child with an environment which is permissive, in that there is no attempt to impose the rules of others onto the child, and which is nourishing in that the environment provides for the satisfaction of the child's desires and interests.
>
> According to some, a permissive and nourishing school environment is all the child needs. Others, however, argue that persons characteristically develop internal blockages or inhibitions of their natural desires and interests, with the result that they fall into mental disease and unhappiness . . . The school should not only provide a permissive nourishing environment, but also work to remove inhibitions on self-expression. (Wolterstorff, 1980, p. 17-18)

The advocates of Values Clarification hold this latter view. Their procedures aim to remove any inhibitions in the realm of values (all inhibitions are negative) which students might have picked up from home, church, or elsewhere. Exactly how this takes place will be discussed later.

The view that the self is intrinsically good, that corruption comes only from one's parents, and from society, arose at least in modern times with Rousseau, continued through the nineteenth century and has culminated in the twentieth century, especially in the United States. In the recent past this self-expression or actualization theory of human nature has dominated much of American psychotherapy, popular psychology, and educational theory. From Rogerian therapy to Transactional Analysis to EST (Erhard Seminar Training) to open classrooms and Values Clarification, "selfist" therapists and educators have sought to promote mental health and happiness through the magic door of

"self-expression." If we develop unconditional trust among students (and between students and teachers), remove inhibitions, support moral relativism, and let each do his own thing then all will be well. (For critiques of this strongly narcissistic position, see Campbell, 1975; Vitz, 1977; Lasch, 1979; Kilpatrick, 1983; Wallach & Wallach, 1983.)

Raths, et al. (1966), p. 9, specifically note the similarity of their basic orientation to that of Carl Rogers -- one of the major theorists committed to the innate goodness of the self. Further evidence that values clarification theorists don't accept evil as a part of human nature is their failure to even raise the issue much less address it. Presumably, they don't do this because the problem of evil raises the issue of objective values, as well as the question of how to deal with the intrinsically flawed self -- a self that is given absolute power in the Values Clarification model.

In spite of the popularity of this self-theory, psychologists of almost all "schools" have been consistently critical of this position. In fact, the recent criticisms have been especially strong. The central thrust of these critiques has been two-fold. First, there is substantial objective evidence that man is not intrinsically entirely good. Instead, human nature comes with a significant natural component of selfishness and aggressiveness. The clinical evidence assembled over many years from a large and heterogeneous group of people reveals the presistent recurrence of such behaviors as sadism, destructiveness, naricissism, and violent fantasies and dreams. The convoluted optimistic explanation is that society causes such things. But, if human beings are so intrinsically good how did they happen to set up so many bad societies? It is simpler, more in accord with accumulated evidence, and more economical, from a theoretical point of view, to accept the intrinsic dual nature of man.

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Other arguments about human selfishness steadily gaining ground are those of the ethologists and sociobiologists. For example, Nobel laureates Konrad Lorenz (1966) and Niko Tinbegren (1968), fully accept aggression as one of the basic characteristics of animals, especially of the primates and of man in particular. They see aggression as usually quite functional in maintaining social organization and in keeping other groups of the same species at a reasonable distance. Warding off predators also has obvious benefits. To an ethologist, aggression, like all traits, can be either "good," that is, functional, or "bad," that is, dysfunctional, depending on the circumstance in which it is being displayed. As for the claim that man is naturally without aggression, that is preposterous. Indeed, our very success and dominance as a species strongly suggests we have too much of it. Both Lorenz and Tinbergen believe man's aggressive capacity is now out of balance with recent cultural changes. As a result a lively debate has developed over the exact nature of our aggression and how to control it (also see Wilson, 1975; Campbell, 1975, 1979).

It is not just scientific evidence and theoretical discussion that discredit the "total intrinsic goodness" assumption. The demise of our supposedly neurotic inhibitions in our classrooms, has not served to bring a great increase in student happiness and mental health -- if anything the opposite seems to have occurred (Wynne, 1981). In short, the assumption about the basic psychological nature of the self, which stands at the heart of the Values Clarification theory, is false. This weakness alone is enough to remove it as a sensible candidate for a theory of moral education.

Philosophical Critique

In this section some of the many rational difficulties with the Values Clarification model will be examined.

The actual moral position of Raths, Simon et al. is usually personal relativism, namely that what is good and bad is so only for a given person. At other times they seem to assume a still more drastic position that values don't actually exist -- there are only things which one likes or dislikes. In both cases, it follows that blaming and praising anyone's values or behavior is to be avoided. The problem is that the relativist position involves Values Clarification in a number of very basic contradictions. Taken as a whole, these contradictions completely undermine the coherence of the system. The first basic contradiction is that, in spite of the personal relativity of all values, the theorists clearly believe that Values Clarification is good. That is, relativity aside, students should engage in their Values Clarification program; they should prize their model of how to clarify values. Raths and Simon attack the inculcation of traditional values by teachers. But they simultaneously urge teachers to inculcate the value of clarifying values by using their system. Indeed when they argue for their system they moralize and sermonize like anyone else. They criticize traditional values inculcation as "selling," "pushing," and "forcing one's own pet values" on children at the price of free inquiry, reason, etc. (e.g. Raths, et al., p. 41) But when it comes to the value of their position, relativism has conveniently disappeared.

The second major contradiction in Values Clarification derives from the anti-value or anti-nomian assumptions found in the system. (The term anti-nomian refers to the position that there are no values, only things one likes or dislikes.) The anti-nomian position ends up -- oddly but perhaps

predictably enough -- in authoritarianism. This consequence is beautifully identified by Wolterstorff (1980, pp. 111-131) whose analysis we will present.

When Raths et al. bring up the question of whether the child should be allowed to choose anything he wishes they answer "No." Parents and teachers have the right (sic) to set some "choices" as off-limits. But they don't have this right because the choices are wrong. Instead, they say that they have this right because certain choices would be intolerable to the parent or teacher. As Wolterstorff cogently concludes: "Thus does antinomianism turn into arbitrary authority." (Wolterstorff, 1980, p. 127) The only rationale for the forbidding of a particular choice is that the teacher or parent finds the choice personally offensive or inconvenient. And, of course, teachers and parents (usually!) also have the power to enforce their will. This most disturbing "logic" is instructively portrayed by the Values Clarification theorists in the following example:

> Teacher: So some of you think it is best to be honest on tests, is that right? (Some heads nod affirmatively.) And some of you think dishonesty is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I guess some of you are not certain. (Heads nod.) . . .
>
> Ginger: Does that mean that we can decide for ourselves whether we should be honest on tests here?
>
> Teacher: No, that means that you can decide on the value. I personally value honesty; and although you may choose to be dishonest, I shall insist that we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest, but one can't do anything any time, and in this class I shall expect honesty on tests.
>
> Ginger: But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value?
>
> Sam: Sure you're telling us what we should do and believe in.
>
> Teacher: Not exactly, I don't mean to tell you what you should value. That's up to you. But I do mean that in this class, not elsewhere necessarily, you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain consequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose dishonesty as a value may

not practice it here, that's all I'm saying. Further questions anyone? (Raths et al., 1966, pp. 114-115).

From this example we might suggest as analogies: "You may or may not steal in other stores, but I shall expect and insist on honesty in my store." Likewise, "You are not to be a racist in my class, but elsewhere that is up to you," you may have "more freedom" somewhere else.

A Critique of Procedures and Strategies

A major part of Values Clarification are the classroom exercises which exemplify the system in action. These excercises are called "strategies", and they are easily used vehicles for discussing and clarifying values within the framework of the Values Clarification philosophy. They have been a major reason for the popularity of the approach. Even those educators aware of the relativistic philosophy of Values Clarification have often used the exercises under the assumption that they are neutral tools with which to approach the topic of moral education. (For a critique of Values Clarification procedures as well as other aspects since, see Baer (1977, 1980, 1982), Bennett and Delattre (1978), and Vitz (1981a).)

We have not carefully evaluated each of the published 79 strategies in the handbook (Simon et al., 1978). However, it is possible to make some useful evaluative generalizations. First, the actual questions asked of the students (plus the supporting text) are filled with the social ideology of a small segment of American society. This segment is secular, relativistic, very permissive, openly anti-religious, and generally ultra-liberal (e.g., see Baer, 1977).

It is important to keep in mind that many questions even if neutrally worded carry strong ideological overtones. That is, to control what questions are asked, even to get a question on the agenda is in many instances to

inevitably reflect ideology -- as most politicians know quite well. The major reason for this is that even to raise a question about something previously considered settled or unimportant is in itself an ideological activity. It unsettles a previous answer or gives importance to a previously unimportant issue. Questions typical of those recommended for secondary students and adults include:

> Think giving grades in school inhibits meaningful learning?
> Approve of premarital sex for boys?
> Approve of premarital sex for girls?
> Think sex education instruction in schools should include techniques [!] for lovemaking, contraception?
> Think that teachers should discuss their personal lives with students?
> Would approve of a marriage between homosexuals being sanctioned by a priest, minister, or rabbi?
> Would approve of a young couple trying out marriage by living together for six months before actually getting married?
> Would encourage legal abortion for an unwed daughter?
> Would take your children to religious services even if they don't want to do?
> Would approve of contract marriages in which the marriage would come up for renewal every few years?
> Would be upset if your daughter were living with a man who had no intentions of marriage? If you son were living with a woman? Etc.
> Would be upset if organized religion disappeared?
> Think the government should help support daycare centers for working mothers?
> Think that parents should be subsidized to pick any school they want for their children?
> Think we should legalize mercy killings? (Simon, et al. p. 49-53)

In addition, the very wording of these questions suggests a favored response, one in line with the author's philosophy. For example, when they want a positive answer they start a question with "approve" or "would approve"; when they want a negative answer, e.g., "Would be upset if organized religion disappeared," they use other approaches. The word upset suggests something negative. It subtly implies that one should not be upset. Of course, they don't ask such questions as, "Would be upset if public schools disappeared?" Two other questions make this point in another way. Consider the item "Think the government should help support daycare centers for working

mothers." Here the bias is toward "yes". "Think that parents should be subsidized to pick any school they want for their children," here the bias is toward no. In the first question tax money "helps support", but in the second question tax money is called a "subsidy." For example, why not ask the question this way: "Think the government should restrict children to the public school rather than to the school the student freely chooses?" In short, in spite of claims to neutrality, the above questions show much bias including the simple political one of supporting the growth of state-controlled secular education while attacking any threat to this position.

The common procedures of Values Clarification have other negative consequences. The procedural goal of increasing the number of alternative positions on a given issue reinforces the idea that values are all relative. Each of the potential different values, for example, about premarital chastity, is likely to be embodied by at least one of the students' peers. This makes it psychologically very hard to maintain a firm belief in any absolute value without experiencing painful peer rejection. It is very difficult even for adults to reject a belief or behavior without also seeming to reject the person.

Here is still another kind of bias in a Values Clarification strategy for use with adults quoted fom an article by Bennett and Delattre (1978):

> In Priorities,, Simon "asks you and your family at the dinner table, or your friends across the lunch table, to rank choices and to defend those choices in friendly discussion." One example of Simon's "delightful possiblities" for mealtime discussion is this:
>
> Your husband or wife is a very attractive person. Your best friend is very attracted to him or her. How would you want them to behave?
> a. Maintain a clandestine relationship so you wouldn't know about it.
> b. Be honest and accept the reality of the relationship
> c. Proceed with a divorce (p. 84)

> [This] exercise asks the student how he would want his spouse and best fried to behave if they were attracted to each other. Typically, the spouse and best friend are presented as having desires they will entrually satisfy anyway; the student is offered only choices that presuppose their relationship. All possibilities for self-restraint, fidelity, regard for others, or respect for mutual relationships and commitments are ignored. (p. 86)

Perhaps the most destructive procedure in this system, however, is the way in which relatively haphazard classroom discussion of intimate family topics undermines the authority of the father and the mother. The exercises foster free associative discussion of everything from family rules about money, chores, and dating to parental values and sanctions about masturbation, homosexuality, and premarital sex. This procedure easily alienates children from parents. It also violates the rights to privacy of the student and of his parent. Much of the angry and increasingly successful rejection of Values Clarification programs in public schools has come from parents' deep dismay over this issue: the public discussion of the private aspects of family life. Another way of making this point is to note that Values Clarification sessions are very much like group psychotherapy. That is, indirectly Values Clarification leads students into group encounter sessions without their knowing that this will take place. One result is that intimate and personal information is often revealed under group pressure. For a detailed discussion of how this violates the right to privacy, see Lockwood (1977).

Evaluative Data

In contrast to the clear negative side-effects of Values Clarification just mentioned, e.g., the pushing of a particular social ideology, ignoring or rejecting parental values, invasion of family privacy, the <u>direct</u>, supposedly intended, effects of Values Clarification are very limited. Despite the high level of interest and writing about this approach, only a small proportion of

these writings represents focused, relatively rigorous research (Leming, 1981, p. 147; Lockwood, 1978, p. 359). In other words, much of the writing has been of the how-to-do-it nature, or general pleadings for or against the approach. There has only been modest attention to whether it does what its proponents say it should.

The advocates of Values Clarification have contended that their aim is not to change students' states of mind, but actual behavior (Raths et al., 1978, p. 248). But when their definitions of behavior are articulated, we discover that the desired "behaviors" come close to states of mind. The proponents want students to acquire "purposeful, proud, positive and enthusiastic behavior patterns" (Raths, 1978, p. 248). (Note that all of these "behaviors" can be directed toward moral or immoral ends, e.g., someone can be a proud and enthusiastic thief.) The practical fact is that most of the limited research on Values Clarification has been directed toward paper and pencil tests that evaluate students' states of mind. In these studies, some students are exposed to Values Clarification approaches, while other students are not. Then both groups of students are given some test(s) to see whether the experimental or control groups have shifted their patterns of values toward becoming more positive, proud, and so on. In 1981, Leming examined 33 good quality studies of the Values Clarification approach. He determined that these studies applied, among themselves, 70 separate tests of statistical significance to the data assembled (many studies applied two or more such tests). Of the 70 tests, only 15 (21 percent) showed that the experimental group moved significantly in the appropriate direction. In the other 55 tests, either there was no significant movement, or the movement was in the wrong direction (Leming, 1981, p. 156). Another thorough review of the research reported approximately similar conclusions (Lockwood, 1978).

Thus, it appears that even on paper and pencil tests Values Clarification does not typically produce the effects its supporters claim for it. Indeed, if it does not "work" in experimental studies, presumably conducted by trained and motivated teachers, it is probably even less efficacious in typical classroom situations. This does not mean that Values Clarification has no effects; it only means that it does not appear to generate the sorts of effects its designers hope to produce; whether it promotes side effects on students, and whether those effects are good or bad, were not issues addressed in the evaluative research.

We must also of course be concerned with the question of whether the approach, if it does work, is a good idea in terms of its own assumptions. The obvious assumptions underlying the approach are that (a) it is important that people in general, and young persons in particular, believe strongly in whatever they value, and (b) the values they choose without adult intervention will be desirable, or good. There is neither a commonsense or research base for these assumptions. Clearly, on many occasions, tentativeness and open-mindedness are normal and healthy characteristics -- they suggest a willingness to learn, or to consider both sides. When someone has a correct opinion, and must carry it out in the face of resistance, their pride and certitude may be desireable. But under other circumstances such characteristics can be associated with arrogance and dogmatism. As to the assumption that young people will usually choose good values without special instruction, as we noted above, this is a naive view of human nature. In fact, our opinions about important social issues are always largely shaped by the socializing environment around us. Thus, adolescent declarations to the contrary, young peoples' values are significantly affected by adult influences; if responsible adults, such as teachers, do not try and promote

good values, irresponsible adults may succeed in promoting bad ones (even if the youths who apply such values believe they are reaching their own conclusions).

Conclusion

Very simply, the contradictions and incoherence of Values Clarification demonstrate that it is a shallow and intellectually confused system. We have been informed from various acquaintances in school systems throughout the country that because of parental protest Values Clarification has begun to lose its acceptance (for a case history, see Eger, 1981); nevertheless, its widespread success reveals the disturbing prevelance of a confused moral relativism in much of American education.

Kohlberg's Moral Development Approach: Model 2

The "moral development" approach has been closely tied to the research of Lawrence Kohlberg, although he has inspired a number of other collaborators. Kohlberg, taking off from the work of psychologist Jean Piaget, proposed the existence of a series of stages, or levels, in the moral development of typical human beings. In a large sense, his proposition is consistent with the popular recognition that children and adolescents, as they mature, become able to handle more elaborate intellectual tasks including more complex moral analyses.

Kohlberg has taken this tendency and posited a series of <u>six</u> universal stages of moral development. According to his theory, all young people transit through these stages, although most people stop at some level before reaching Stage six. The rate of transition between stages varies among different individuals, although that rate can be somewhat affected by external

factors. Kohlberg's basic research strategy has been to present moral hypothetical dilemmas to children and young people and then to observe the reasons given for why one course of action should be followed rather than another. Kohlberg claims to have observed that their are six quite distinct patterns of reasoning which people use.

Before turning to these six stages, let us note that Kohlberg is interested in the person's dominant pattern of moral reasoning: he is concerned with the form and process of the thought used, not with the actual moral decision made. Thus, two people may disagree about what is to be done but use the same kind of reasoning, or they may come to the same conclusion but for very different reasons. Like so many modern psychological thinkers he is concerned with structure and changes in structure (process), but not in content.

Kohlberg claims that when a person is studied over a number of years the evidence shows that he goes through a developmental series of moral reasoning patterns. Each pattern represents a qualitatively distinct "stage" in the person's life. The sequence of stages is the same for all people, although as noted most never get to the higher stages -- that is Stages 5 and 6. Since he proposes that there are six stages this means that everyone develops morally by starting at Stage 1 and over time proceeds moving up in order from 2 toward 6. According to Kohlberg, nobody ever skips a Stage and nobody ever regresses to an earlier Stage. He does, however, allow for people to show a mixture of two adjacent stages, that is, a person can be in a transition between two stages. Briefly, the stages are:

I. Preconventional Level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either

the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange or favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level comprises the following two stages:

Stage 1 punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

Stage 2 instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is one not only of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. This level comprises the following two stages:

Stage 3 interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention: "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4 "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of social behavior. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and

principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups of persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5 social-contract legalistic orientation. Generally, this stage has utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis on procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational consideration of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the United States government and constitution.

Stage 6 universal ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical . . .; they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (from Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 86-87, in Beck et al., 1971).

Some Specific Criticisms

Even from the above brief presentation it should be clear that Kohlberg's approach is a much more serious intellectual venture than Values Clarification. There is no doubt that Kohlberg has generated a great deal of research and important thinking about the psychology of moral reasoning. Such activity is a real contribution; nevertheless, the central issue is: What is the validity of Kohlberg's model. This question has generated much comment, controversy and criticism within the academic community. Only a few aspects of this controversy will be summarized to further exemplify Kohlberg's approach and, in particular, some of the difficulties with it.

1. The absence of selfishness (or the perfect self) critique

Kohlberg assumes that the natural direction of moral development is toward internalized cognitive moral controls in which at the end the individual is socially and morally autonomous. Each individual will thus ultimately discover for himself a natural cognitive morality that owes nothing important to cultural or historical heritage. (Curiously, however, Kohlberg argues that the social environment is a major stimulus that drives moral cognitive development. Somehow this environment, however, is not supposed to affect the content of a person's morality -- only its structure.)

The nature of the "self" that controls and uses the person's cognitive apparatus is not analyzed by Kohlberg. Still, like Rousseau, and like Raths and Simon et al, he appears to assume that is it intrisically entirely good. There is simply no problem of a natural human tendency to evil. The whole concept of the autonomous intrinsically good self is one that looks increasingly like the enshrinement of narcissism at the center of the self -- in this case at the center of the moral self. (For detailed support of this interpretation see Vitz, 1977, MacIntrye, 1981, and especially Wallach and Wallach, 1983.)

Indeed, the implicit position that there is no natural human tendency to evil by itself makes Kohlberg's model suspect as a model of moral development. That is, Kohlberg assumes there is no persistent tendency for humans to exploit, hurt, and oppress others -- except possibly for those people still at Stages 1 and 2. And even here such selfishness is the result of inadequate cognitive functioning. In other words, evil is the result of a developmental failure -- not the natural and common pursuit of self-interest.

Rest (1980), a colleague of Kohlberg's, claims that Stage 6 moral understanding could not be misued or distorted by self-interest no matter how

sophisticated the attempt. In other words, it would be impossible to construct a Stage 5 or 6 moral argument for such things as genocide. Apparently Rest believes that once a certain cognitive understanding of justice has been reached, these concepts cannot be seriously contaminated by such ugly things as sadistic motives, self-interest, needs for power, or vengence. He offers no evidence for his claim, however, and it is not hard to cast doubt on it. After all, any principle of justice must also have a rationale identifying who is to receive justice. The application of any abstract principle to a concrete situation often involves complex and problematic reasoning. For example, consider the issues of slavery and of abortion, or cruelty to animals. All of these issues center around <u>who</u> is a person -- who is entitled to receive justice? Slaves were not considered fully human and they were considered property of their owners. Likewise, many today don't consider an unborn baby fully human -- instead it is entitled to less justice than an adult and often can be disposed of like property. Finally, many conservationists argue that certain animal species must be protected at great cost to certain humans. The issue of justice throughout most of history has had much to do with defining the domain of its applicability. Since Stage 6 reasoning can be used to justify abortion, it could no doubt be used to justify genocide of other types.

2. The feminist critique

Kohlberg's theory has been criticized as <u>androcentric</u>; it expresses a "characteristically masculine view of morality." Carol Gilligan, a colleague of Kohlberg, has made this point rather well. (1977, 1982) Gilligan points out that the initial 1958 study, which is still the core of empirical support, was run exclusively on young, American male subjects -- from which Kohlberg

then generalized to all humanity in all eras. Gilligan also claims that Kohlberg's preoccupation with "male" values -- such as rationalism, individualism, and liberalism -- is responsible for the fact that adult females were typically found at lower stages than males. Males tended to be closer to Stage 4, females nearer Stage 3. (Stage 3 is "good boy-nice girl"; Stage 4 is "system-maintaining morality," e.g., law and order.)

Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (in Kohlberg, 1984) have responded to this criticism by claiming that the mean difference between males and females on the moral development scale was often small and not of any real substance. Furthermore, when the difference was substantial they claim this was due to the fact that the males in question had had more education than the lower scoring females. According to Kohlberg, men and women will have equal moral development scores if education, status of job, and other environmental factors are held constant. (As we will see, however, Kohlberg's response to this criticism is unsatisfactory.)

Gilligan succinctly summarizes the quite different approach to moral problems taken by female subjects. Consider the best known Kohlberg dilemma of Heinz. Heinz must steal a drug from a village druggist since it costs much more than he can pay -- or else he must let his wife die. Gilligan says:

> Here in the light of its probable outcome -- his wife dead, or Heinz in jail, brutalized by the violence of the experience and his life compromised by a record of felony -- the dilemma itself changes. Its resolution has less to do with the relative weights of life and property in an abstract moral conception than with the collision it has produced between two lives, formerly conjoined but now in opposition, where the continuation of one life can now occur only at he expense of the other. Given this construction, it becomes clear why consideration (for women) revolves around the issue of sacrifice and why guilt becomes the inevitable concomitant of either resolution (1977, p. 512).

She continues:

> The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in terms of the real, to request or supply the information missing about the

> nature of the people and the places where they live, shifts their judgment away from the hierarchical ordering of principles and the formal procedures of decision-making that are critical for scoring at Kohlberg's highest stages. Given the constraints of Kohlberg's system and the biases in his research sample, this different orientation can only be construed as a failure in development. While several of the women in the research sample clearly articulated what Kohlberg regarded as a postconventional metaethical position, none of them were considered by Kohlberg to be principled in their normative moral judgments. Instead, the women's judgments pointed toward an identification of the violence inherent in the dilemma itself which was seen to compromise the justice of any of its possible resolutions. This construction of the dilemma led the women to recast the moral judgment from a consideration of the good to a choice between evils (ibid.).

She quite correctly proposes that in giving exclusive moral weight to any principle of justice, Kohlberg underestimates the moral worth of other principles, especially an ethic of caring -- of mercy. Two other critics of Kohlberg, Hogan and Emler (1978) criticize this bias of Kohlberg -- as does Gilligan -- by citing Shakespeare:

> Thus, the female virtue of mercy becomes a Stage 3 conception. But, as Portia reminds Shylock, mercy qualifies justice. . . "though justice be thy plea, consider this, that in the course of justice, none of us should see salvation. We do pray for mercy" (p. 529).

Of course, Gilligan's major complaint was <u>not</u> that women scored lower than men. Instead she criticized Kohlberg for his exclusive reliance on abstract, rationally ordered principles, especially the principle of justice -- and his neglect of other principles, especially mercy. Kohlberg, however, has shown no tendency to change his model in response to such crucial criticism. To introduce a major new principle, such as mercy involving empathy and interpersonal sensitivity, would compromise the coherence of Kohlberg's abstract, cognitive representation of moral development.

3. The critique of Kohlberg's atheism

Kohlberg classifies any appeal to God as authoritative. It is an appeal to rules, which automatically puts a person down to Stage 4 -- or possibly

lower. This position comes from his placing the authority of the autonomous individual, instead of the authority of God at the center of his system. Thus his model is explicitly atheist in its understanding of the moral life. Such atheism is an assumption made by Kohlberg on necessarily non-empirical grounds. It is impossible to scientifically prove or disprove the existence of God, or His moral code. The notion that "true autonomy" -- that is true freedom -- including freedom from the ego and its selfishness -- comes from love of God appears to be antithetical to Kohlberg's system. In any case, obedience to the self or to God are both obediences to an authority. Here is Kohlberg's description of his scoring system which makes this anti-religious bias very clear. The respondent, a boy named Richard, was asked for his moral reaction to mercy killing. He replied:

> I don't know. In one way, it's murder; it's not a right or a privilege of man to decide who shall live and who should die. God put life into everybody on earth and you're taking away something from that person that came directly from God, and you're destroying something that is very sacred; it's in a way part of God and it's almost destroying a part of God when you kill a person. There's something of God in everyone.

Kohlberg comments:

> Here Richard clearly displays a Stage 4 concept of life as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order. The value of human life is universal, it is true for all humans. It is still, however, dependent on something else, upon respect for God and God's authority; it is not an autonomous human value (Kohlberg, 1970, pp. 111-112).

Kohlberg simply assumes that the principle of obedience to self, a value currently held by some Americans, is higher than one based on obedience to God. Furthermore, it is not at all clear how this last answer is a standard Stage 4 answer. That is, it is not obviously directed at system-maintaining, or law-and-order. Apparently, a belief in the sacredness of life and concern for God's presence in everyone is the same thing as a standard Stage 4 defense of "law and order."

Kohlberg is fond of citing the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. as an example of Stage 6, the highest moral stage. And yet Kohlberg completely fails to grasp how King's moral stature was an expression of his deep religious committment. For example, here is a representative quote of King's made the night before his assasination: "I just want to do God's will" (King, 1969, p. 316). In short, Martin Luther King, Jr. provides a classic Stage 4 statement about the fundamental nature of his principles. Indeed, if King did not sincerely believe in God and see his own moral life as lived in response to these beliefs much of his rhetoric would become hypocritical and descend to a very low stage level.

4. The critique of rationalism

Kohlberg assumes that the moral life is primarily determined by rational, logical, or cognitive factors. In other words, human thought (as expressable in so-called left hemisphere verbal skills) is the presumed essential ingredient of the moral life. This common tendency for psychologists to neglect emotional, innate, and nonverbal aspects of human psychology has received growing criticism in recent years, e.g., Zajonc (1980), Siegel (1978). (Vitz (1985) refers to this assumption as "left-hemisphere imperialism.") Kohlberg completely neglects the evidence of the powerful emotional and non-verbal determinants of morality. Let us look at some of this evidence: Yarrow and Zahn-Waxler (1977) show that children only a year old have a capacity for compassion and for various prosocial behaviors. That is, there is good evidence that a reliable capacity for empathy, as well as the ability to show feeling for others beginning at very young ages. This empathy leads to altruistic or "good samaritan" behavior by these very young children. According to Piaget, and also Kohlberg, children this young are so

cognitively underdeveloped that they cannot "think" about doing good. They are at a stage of simple selfishness. The now considerable evidence for empathy and early emotion based helping actions of children leads psychologists like Hoffman (1978, 1981) to propose a very early empathic -- or emotional -- basis for altruism.

The evidence for empathy as central to early moral life represents a strong criticism of Kohlberg's Stage 1. It is important to note that such moral responses in the very young are unlikely to be mediated by cognition -- much less by articulated responses to "dilemmas." That much important emphatic behavior is determined by emotional responses occurring long before any cognition is presuasively argued by Zajonc (1980). In many respects Gilligan's position about the interpersonal foundation of women's moral thought is reinforced by this recent work on empathy.

Even in the realm of perceptual ability traditional Piagetian psychology has come under severe criticism (see Brown & Desforges, 1979; Siegel, 1978). For example, Schiff (1983) has shown that the child is capable of demonstrating conservation of length long before the child reaches the 6-12 year old stage. Specifically, the child is capable of conservation by age 4 1/2 if the task doesn't require a verbal response. The typical failure to find conservation at the earlier age was due to a lack of linguistic sophistication -- it was not because the child didn't understand the concept (see also Siegel, 1978). Likewise, there is every reason to think that Kohlberg's reliance on abstract dilemma's and on the subject's ability to give various complex verbal reasoning responses is also distorting our ability to understand children's important early moral life.

5. The methodological and empirical critique

The major empirical critique, so far, has been focused on Stage 6 -- the model's highest stage. The central issue is the lack of evidence for people scoring at Stage 6 -- the stage characterized by the universal ethical principle of justice. The result has been that Kohlberg (1984) now admits that Stage 6 is a hypothetical stage with no real empirical support. He has quite regularly been unable to find human beings at Stage 6. This withdrawal of Stage 6 is not a theoretical concession, since Kohlberg remains committed to Stage 6 as the truly highest stage -- but one that rarely develops. Nevertheless, the failure to find the proposed sixth stage is a blow to the system.

A concluding methodological difficulty has been Kohlberg's almost exclusive focus on abstract rather fantastic dilemmas like that of Heinz. These describe moral dilemmas that almost no one ever will face. They are far removed from the actual moral conflicts that characterize people's actual lives. This unreal quality has led Kohlberg and his critics to describe then as "science fiction" dilemmas.

6. The ideological critique

Perhaps the most frequent criticism of the Kohlberg model has been that it embodies ideological assumptions that are presented as part of a supposedly scientifically verified theory (see as examples Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977; Hogan & Emler, 1978; Sampson, 1981; Levin, 1982; Shweder, 1982.)

One sign of such an ideological and cultural bias is the fact that a moral judgment score depends a great deal on education level. For example, in various studies in which males score higher in moral development, Kohlberg argues this is due to the average greater education and job status of men. Such an observation immediately raises serious issues of bias in Kohlberg's test. Typical human experience does not reliably bear this out that better educated people are more moral. This raises serious questions about ideological bias in the test. This question becomes acute on reading the comments by Rest (1980) about research in which it was found that moral judgment scores increase with education as follows:

Junior high school students	22
Senior high school students	32
College students	42
Graduate students in business	52
Students in liberal Protestant seminary	60
Doctoral students of moral philosophy and political science	65

No doubt Ph.Ds doing research on moral education presumably top the scale! The curious thing is that after describing these results, Rest (1980) makes the following qualification: "Remember that a moral judgment score . . . should not be used as an indication of who is a better person, or who behaves more responsibly" (p. 544).

This disclaimer implies that there is no true "value" associated with a high score on a moral development scale. But, only four pages later, Rest contradicts himself. He says that moral judgment scores are not just a measure of cognitive or intellectual competence -- but that they measure how morally a person behaves as well! That is, he explicitly proposes that such scores predict behavior -- and he means morally superior behavior such as being more cooperative, not cheating, etc.

This issue is extremely important. It must be clearly stated. At times, Kohlberg or Kohlberg's students claim that they are only measuring the level of cognitive competence with which a person reasons about morality, i.e., are they skilled. No value judgment is being made about who is more moral. When Kohlbergians argue this way, the model is justly criticized as trivial. One does not have to be a behaviorist to see that a model of moral thought unrelated to moral action is close to meaningless. Responding to this criticism of triviality Kohlberg and Candee (in Kohlberg, 1984), and others like Blasi (1980) and Rest (1980) have begun to claim, on the basis of some very modest evidence, that people with high moral development scores actually do behave better -- they are more moral people. But, they can't have it both ways. They can't argue that people with high scores aren't any better than others and then someplace else say that they are! This central dispute is intrinsic to any attempt by Kohlbergians to justify their scale by its ability to predict behavior. Once you claim the scale also predicts more moral behavior, then you are claiming that people with high scores are more moral in thought and in action -- which is what being "better" means.

Now, let us return to the criticism that the model is supposedly pervaded with ideology. First, keep in mind the claim that high scores are associated with increasing education and social status -- and that Kohlberg now claims

that high scores predict -- on average -- more moral behavior. This predicts, for example, in this country, that since on average husbands have more education and higher status jobs, they should be more moral than wives. Although both the authors are husbands, we would not make this claim. Neither has it been our experience that graduate students or college professors are obviously more moral than school teachers or farmers, nor has it been our experience that physicians are more moral than nurses, etc. It is true that some groups, on average, have higher skills in verbal or abstract reasoning. However, the relationship between such skills and the practice of morality is problematic at best.

The most common ideological bias attributed to Kohlberg is that his system is an expression of Western liberal social and political ideology (e.g., Sullivan, 1977; Hogan & Emler, 1978; Shweder, 1982). Kohlberg does admit the intellectual origins of his system in Western liberal thought. But, he denies that this origin has effected the "objectivity" of his system (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, in Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg's denial is unconvincing in large part because he fails to see the very way in which he frames the issues of morality as an example of bias. He fails to acknowledge that the act of selecting for emphasis individual autonomy, rights, and related concepts is an example of ideological bias (a point made clearly by Gilligan, 1977, 1982).

However, it is not just what Kohlberg emphasizes that expresses his system's bias -- it is also what is neglected. Kohlberg, for example, fails to address the issue of abortion at all -- certainly one of the central moral dilemmas of our time. A related major moral issue not addressed in the Kohlberg system is adultery. Adultery involves betrayal, interpersonal treason, and almost always lying and deceit -- all ultimately issues of justice. Furthermore, in view of the often painful and destructive affects of

adultery on children -- e.g., intense parental conflict, divorce -- the neglect of such an issue within the Kohlberg literature is indicative of bias. One also looks in vain in the Kohlberg writing for concern with issues like freedom from government controls, etc. Instead the agenda of moral issues covered in the Kohlberg literature are Watergate, the My Lai massacre, obedience in the military, the case for mercy killing, and so on.

Of course, if, in the future the model can satisfactorily deal with both traditional and liberal moral issues and demonstrate its political neutrality and the ideological transcendence of the model's moral solutions, that would be a very strong point for the Kohlberg system, indeed. At the present, however, this remains to be demonstrated and there is little reason to think the logic of the model can satisfactorily deal with traditional moral concerns.

A General Concluding Caution

The most obvious thing about Kohlberg's model is that in spite of close to 30 years of development, its validity remains decidedly uncertain. Indeed, as we have seen, within the last 10 years it has been at the center of intense controversy. Because of the number and power of thse criticisms -- some of which were noted above -- prominent researchers such as Prof. Joseph Adelson, of the University of Michigan, have commented "I suspect the system [of Kohlberg] is beginning to fall apart" (Munson, 1979; see also Adelson, 1975)

Given the importance and difficulty of moral education in general -- and given the parental, political and social issues involved -- it would be most unwise for the schools to adopt such a novel theory. Certainly a <u>minimal</u> prerequisite for introducing any such substantial break with the long history of education practice would be widespread agreement by relevant professionals

on the nature and utility of the new approach (Burke's principle -- see below. In addition, informed parental consent would probably be needed.)

In fact, there has been only modest use of Kohlberg's system in public schools. Instead, Values Clarification approaches, for which there is much less supporting evidence, have been more widely used. In part, this neglect of Kohlberg has been because of the much greater complexity and sophistication of his model. It is a little intimidating -- or impractical -- for the average, already harassed, teacher. In addition, in those limited cases when Kohlberg has attempted to apply his system, e.g. "Just Schools," he has readily acknowledged his models difficulties in handling the concrete daily problems of in-school behavior. This contact with the problem of actual moral teaching in the schools has led Kohlberg (1978) to acknowledge that moral indoctrination is necessary.

We have discussed some of the criticisms of his approach in some detail however, because Kohlberg's model is, at present, the most serious alternative to the character education model. Furthermore, as noted below, Kohlberg explicitly criticizes the character education model, a criticism that needs a response.

General Reflection on the Two Models

There is a considerable body of research on procedures to change people's attitudes, values and conduct. Some of this research (e.g. Hartschorne and May) is discussed in more detail below. In essence, this research shows that it takes a great deal of time and attention to cause substantial change in a person's values, attitudes or conduct. And so, whether either of the preceding two approaches "work" in part depends on how much difference the application of any particular training program in a school should be expected

to make. We must recognize that the in-class activities involved in most of these programs are quite limited in length. Thus, a student might participate in a typical Kohlberg moral development program for 20-40 hours (a student spends about 9,000 hours in K-12 schooling). Again consider some other programs deliberately aimed at affecting human values and conduct -- U.S. Marine boot camp for instance. A Marine recruit spends about 1,000 waking hours in boot camp, and almost all of these hours are crowded with value-affecting activities. The reality is that most in-school values improvement programs are short, low intensity activities; one should not expect they will often produce important changes in human values and conduct.

Probably the most consequential impact of these two approaches is not due to what is taught in classes labelled "values clarification" or "moral development". Instead, we must consider the <u>indirect</u> affects of the approaches on education policies, or on other elements of the formal curriculum. In other words, regardless of whether a particular school or a teacher consciously adopts either of the two approaches, pupils spend large amounts of time attending schools, necessarily under the direction of the adults in charge. What happens during such attendance will inevitably involve moral issues, e.g., how should people act towards each other, what are the pupils' responsibilities towards the school, what should be in the history curriculum. The ways that school employees choose to act toward pupils is significantly determined by the relevant intellectual Zeitgeist. That Zeitgeist is currently prevaded with the attitudes connected with Values Clarification and cognitive development. For example, most teachers, if asked to make some checklist choice, would probably identify the two approaches as the <u>only</u> forms of moral education now practiced in public schools. In fact, such a conclusion would be in error; as will be discussed, many schools still

actively apply other, more constructive approaches. However, the schools applying such approaches (discussed below as "the great tradition") often feel their approach lacks intellectual legitimacy, since it is not "blessed" by the currently popular academic theories. Thus, the "legitimacy" of the preceding two approaches permits them to generate powerful indirect effects. These indirect effects occur in two different ways.

First, both approaches explicitly deprecate traditional values and the methods for their transmission. In spite of their own indoctrinative character, both Values Clarification and Kohlberg's model are opposed to what they call "indoctrination." They are also critical of efforts to affect pupil day-to-day conduct; and they implicitly uphold the rights of students at all levels to choose and express their personal values, regardless of adult preferences. In particular, these two systems are hostile or indifferent with respect to parents. The rights of parents, both as taxpayers and as those most concerned with and responsible for their children, are ignored. This lack of concern is correctly viewed by the parents as an expression of contempt toward them.

Furthermore, the great virtues these approaches attribute to individual rationality conflict with many important themes in psychology. Research and common sense have often revealed the human propensity to use words as devices to hide our true, often emotionally founded beliefs, or to rationalize conduct which serves hedonistic ends. Thus, a classic work on human behavior concluded with the following observation:

> [man] adjusts his social perceptions to fit not only the objective reality but also his wishes and needs...he will misinterpret rather than face up to an opposing set of facts or point of view...[he] has a symbolic capacity and the language that goes with it. Not only can

things be named, manipulated, studied, preserved, and communicated without any physical contact; but things can be called by other than their real names... In short, man lives not only with the reality that confronts him, but with the reality he makes (Berelson & Steiner, 1964, p. 665).

Both approaches also implicitly favor curriculum materials which offer pupils open-ended presentations on important issues, or present arguments on behalf of formerly unpopular positions. This manner of shaping our curriculum can obviously have implications for subjects such as history, social science, sex education, and literature. These subjects comprise a large proportion of the school program.

Thus, both Values Clarification and Kohlberg may have had a considerable impact on the overall school curriculum. These indirect outcomes can be more powerful than any direct impact. After all, topics such as sex education, social science, and literature all have value-related elements. And if both approaches have affected the curriculum or teaching regarding these subjects, total pupil exposure to them will have been greatly increased. Unfortunately, the effects of such indirect -- or covert -- exposure are harder to control or evaluate than exposure through explicit courses.

Rediscovering an Old Approach: Model 3

In spite of the present American emphasis or cognitve skills, the transmission of moral values has been the dominant concern of education in all persisting cultures. Cognitive knowledge, such as factual information and techniques of intellectual analysis, have sometimes been important educational aims. However, this goal has rarely been given priority over moral education. The policies typically followed in American education in our times

-- where transmitting morality is given a secondary priority -- represent a sharp break with the previous tradition.

Some Definitions

The preceding comments requires amplification. The term "moral values" means the specific values generally respected in particular cultures. Webster defines morality as the "principles of right and wrong behavior." The forms of such principles will vary among cultures: During World War II, if a German citizen loved his homeland, he was likely to be hostile to Americans, and vice versa. Such value conflicts along national or ethnic lines are common. Therefore, it is typical for the members of all cultures to have a special regard for the characteristics of their own culture, e.g., its language, geographic location, traditions. In any event, probably all persisting cultures treat the characteristic we call patriotism as a basic principle: a moral value. As a result, opprobrium is traditionally associated with terms such as treason and traitor. Likewise, we can recognize common patterns of principles about right and wrong behavior which govern interpersonal relations in cultures, e.g., beliefs about proper conduct among family members or beliefs which determine the nature of reciprocal relationships. Such beliefs are laden with strong moral components.

In sum, "moral values" are the vital common principles which shape human relations in each particular culture. Often, these values have what is popularly called a religious base (e.g., the Ten Commandments). However, whether their base is religious or secular, such values in a given culture are expected to receive widespread and reflexive affirmation under most circumstances.

There is also some ambiguity surrounding the term "educational systems." Contemporary Americans naturally think in terms of formal schools (public or private) and colleges. But for most of history -- and all of prehistory -- such formal agencies as schools were only a small part of the educational processes surrounding children and adolescents. In traditional cultures, educational needs were largely satisfied by such non-school agencies as: nuclear and extended families; religious institutions; "societies" for the young, organized and monitored by adults; the complex incidental life of pre-industrial rural and urban socieites; and the demands of work -- in and out of the family -- which were speedily placed on the young. Technically speaking, such agencies "socialize" young persons into adult life. Even in contemporary America, many of these agencies still play important educational roles. Nonetheless, at least in the modern period, there has been a strong trend towards the gradual replacement of such agencies by schools.

Transmitting Moral Values

Whether the dominant education system has been formal or informal, moral education has persistently played a central role. Presumably, this role has been necessary and universal because:

(a) Human beings are uniquely adaptable animals who can live in diverse cultural systems. But, as the anthropologist Yehudi Cohen put it, "no society allows for the random and promiscuous expression of emotions to just anyone. Rather, one may communicate those feelings, either verbally, physically, or materially, to certain people" (1964, p. 168). Because our means of communicating emotions are socially specific, young people must gradually be socialized into the right (or moral) practices which are appropriate to their special environment.

(b) Without moral education, the human propensity for selfishness -- or simply the advancement of self-interest -- can operate with destructive effect on adult institutions. Thus, moral education is necessary to cultivate our inherent but moderate propensity for disinterested sacrifice. In other words, the institutions of any persisting society must be organized to insure that people's "unselfish genes" receive adequate reinforcement.

The general modes of moral education have remained relatively stable throughout all cultures through most human experience. In spite of moderate differences in the content of the morals transmitted, the general modes of "teaching" such traits, which will be described shortly, have been widely accepted.

It is true there have been social class and sex-related differences as to the quantity and quality of moral education delivered to the young: for instance, in many environments, resource limits restricted the amount of moral education provided to lower class youths. Furthermore, the substance of the moral education transmitted to older youths sometimes was not always been agreed upon: thus, according to Plato, Socrates was put to death because the Athenians disapproved of the moral education he was offering to the youth of Athens. But such variations do not reduce the strength of the general model. Plato, himself, in his lengthy discourse on education in The Republic (circa 390 B.C.) emphasized the importance of constraining the learning influences on children and youths, to insure appropriate moral outcomes. And Socrates, as portrayed by Plato, consistently displayed a high level of pro-Athenian patriotism. He fought on Athens' behalf in two wars and, rather than go into exile, voluntarily chose to drink the poison hemlock, as ordered by his fellow Athenian citizens.

In relatively modern times (from about 1800 onward), conflicts about moral education have often arisen between secular and church related educators. But, until fairly recently, both groups of disputants have agreed on many of the behavioral ends of their programs. They wanted children to be moral, that is, to be honest, diligent, obedient, and patriotic. Thus, after the American Revolution, deists and secularists such as Jefferson and John Adams felt our experiment in democracy would surely fail unless our citizens acquired an unusually high degree of self-discipline and public spiritedness. They termed this medley of values "republican virtue." As a result, many of the separate constitutions of the original thirteen American states, framed during and immediately after the Revolution, contained provisions such as "...no government can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virture..." (the quote is from the Virginia Constitution). The Founders believed that popular education would be a means of developing such precious traits. As the social historians David J. and Shelia Rothman said, "the business of schools [in our early history] was not reading and writing but citizenship, not education but social control" (1975, p. 164). To our modern ears, the term "social control" may have a perjorative sound. But it simply and correctly means that schools were primarily concerned with affecting conduct, rather than transmitting information or affecting states of mind.

The Great Tradition

In sum, there were at times conflicts in traditional societies about issues of moral education and the techniques for teaching the tradition. Still, there were great areas of congruence around the "great tradition" of moral education. This tradition is not articulated in any one document or

curriculum. But it can be derived from documents generated in historical societies. Furthermore, ethnographic studies of many ancient, and currently existing primitive cultures also provide revealing anecdotes and principles.

1. The great tradition is first concerned with moral conduct -- the development of good habits -- as contrasted to moral concepts or moral rationales. Thus, it gives great emphasis to appropriate courtesy and deference. Take the moral mandate "honor thy father and mother..." Typically, the act of honoring can be seen, and traditional societies put great emphasis on observable "honoring" behavior. Other observable elements of conduct are appropriate dress, the recitation of particular words or phrases, the assumption of required postures, or the evident display of motivation through physical effort or self-restraint. One might say that many elements of the tradition anticipated what we now call behavioral psychology: thus, parallels between habit formation in humans and animals were often consciously drawn (e.g., see Socrates use of the metaphor about the role of trainers in training horses in his "Apologia").

2. The great tradition primarily focussed on routine, day-to-day moral issues: telling the truth in face of evident temptation, doing an assigned task, displaying ordinary courtesy, practicing hardihood, or obeying legitimate authority. The assumption was that most moral challenges arose in mundane situations, and that people are often prone to act improperly. Appropriate education was necessary to make proper conduct likely -- or at least more likely than otherwise.

3. The great tradition assumed that moral education was not the sole responsibility of any one agency of society. The varieties of moral problems which can confront adults and youths are innumerable. Their problems will arise in diverse situations. Thus, youths must be taught to practice morality

in many environments. Again, one education agency (e.g., the nuclear family or the neighborhood) may be dificient for some reason, so a high level of redundancy was needed. Finally, unless all agencies are enlisted in appropriate moral education, some agencies may choose to use their lack of responsibility to educate the young for immoral purposes. In other words, there could be no neutrality about educationg the young in morality: youth-serving agencies were either actively pro-moral or, by their "neutrality," amoral or anti-moral by transmittting an air of indifference towards a matter which had to have high priority.

4. The great tradition believed that moral conduct needed persistent and pervasive reinforcement, especially with regards to the young. A large number of techniques were mobilized to advance this end. Literature, proverbs, legends, drama, ritual, and folk tales were all used for cautionary purposes. (For a recent representation of the utility of such sources of moral instruction, see Coles, 1981.) Preaching, in explicit and implicit forms, was an important resource. Systems of symbolic and real rewards were developed and sustained: in schools, there were ribbons, awards, and other signs of moral merit; in noneducational agencies, praise and criticism, and many symbolic forms of recognition, were often used and recommended.

5. The great tradition saw an important relationship between the advancement of moral learning and the suppression of wrong conduct. When wrong acts occurred, especially in the presence of the young, they were to be aggressively punished. Punishment was used as much to stop bad examples from flourishing as to correct particular wrongdoers. The tradition also developed concepts such as "scandal," meaning a public immoral act which was uniquely wrong because it lowered the prestige of the person and/or institution

affected. Conversely, "secret" immoral acts received less disapproval, since they were less likely to confuse or misdirect innocent persons.

6. The great tradition was not hostile to the intellectual analysis of moral problems. Adults recognized that life occasionally generates moral dilemmas, when two or more moral principles are in conflict. Thus, in the Iliad, composed about 900 B.C., Achilles withdrew his troops from fighting in the Greek forces, because his warrior's honor had been offended by the selfishness of the Greek general Agamemnon; due to this withdrawl, many of Achilles's comrades were killed in battle. It is obvious that the sketch of this incident presents a moral dilemma to listeners, i.e., should Achilles have withdrawn, or stayed and fought? But most of the text of heroic poems such as the Iliad is comprised of stories of people meeting ardorous but evident obligations. Again, in the Jewish religious tradition, learned men are expected to analyze and debate Talmudic moral issues. And other cultures display similar patterns. But such analyses typically rely on a strong foundation of habit-oriented mundane moral instruction and practice. Instruction in exegetical analysis only commenced after the selected neophyte had undergone long periods of testing, memorized large portions of the semi-didactic classics, and displayed appropriate deference toward the experts in exegesis.

7. The great tradition assumed that the most important and complex moral values were transmitted through persistent and intimate person-to-person interaction. In many cases, the transmittors were adult mentors, assigned to develop close and significant relationships with particular youths. Oftentimes, the youths might serve as apprentices to such persons; or, again, the mentors might be adults who accepted significant responsibilities toward a

particular young relative. But, in any event, constructive and important moral shaping required a comparatively high level of engagement.

8. The great tradition had a pessimistic opinion about the mutability of human beings, or the feasibility (or value) of dramatic breaks with previous socjalization patterns. Philosophically speaking, its implicit views were akin to those articulated by Burke in Reflections on the Revolution in France. In Reflections, Burke contrasted organic and rationalistic approaches to change. He contended that rationalistic (often utopian) approaches often generated harmful unforeseen effects which were far more consequential than any potential benefits which might be derived. In particular, Burke was sharply critical of philosophic perspectives which rejected the value of persisting collective human experience and tradition. He would argue that persons who attempted de novo, to form a "new man" are more likely to create a deformity than an improvement.

9. The great tradition long antedated the worldwide development of formal schooling. But, as that development proceeded, the tendency was to insure that the formal academic curriculum was presented in a manner consistent with the transmission of correct habits and values. For instance, William Torrey Harris, a prominent nineteenth century American intellectual, was the long-time superintendent of schools in St. Louis, Missouri, and eventually (1889-1906) the U.S. Commissioner of Education. In 1875, he designed a written exam to be administered to candidates for school principalship in St. Louis; one question asked was "May the teaching of matheratics be made to assist in the development of moral character? If so, how?" (Leidecker, 1946, p. 265).

10. We should not assume that the interjection of moral concern into the academic curriculum usually proceeded in a cumbersome or inartistic fashion.

The famous McGuffey's Reader series featured stories and essays by substantial writers, such as Walter Scott and Charles Dickens. In general, the literary quality of such writings was appropriate to the ages of the students involved. The significant thing about the materials was that they, and their authors, supported the development of certain desired traits.

Character Education: Model 3-A

Perhaps the most recent effloresence of the great tradition in America can be found in the widespread concern with "character education" in our public schools between 1880 and about 1930. The interest was reflected in innumerable efforts to increase the efficiency of public schools in transmitting appropriate moral values. A simple instance of this concern is demonstrated by a page count of the Teachers College Record, a major and long-lived periodical on education research and administration. In the 1922 issues of the Record, a high percent, viz. 19% of 497 pages were clearly dedicated to character-related matters; more recently, in the 1964-65 issue, only .08% (6 of 783 pages) were on such matters. This change shows the decline in interest in the character education model, a decline that has recently been reversed.

The character education efforts assumed that the schools had to operate on a purely secular basis. This basis posed special challenges for moral education. It is true that some earlier education reformers had semi-secular sympathies. But the impact of such sympathies in previous eras had been tempered by pro-religious forces also affecting the schools. For example, before 1900, in America, probably 15-25% of all elementary and secondary school pupils attended schools (either private or public) which were explictly

religious; and another 25-50% attended public schools which were tacitly religious (e.g., with readings from the King James Bible).

The interest in the character education approach was also stimulated by other events: urbanization, which diminished the apparent relevance of many traditional techniques of moral education (e.g., McGuffey's Readers aimed at rural students); the increasing elaboration and prolongation of public schools, which changed the demands made on the institutions and their students; and the growing public faith in the efficacy of "science" which led people to believe that scientific approaches might help schools to handle the responsibilities for moral education.

But educators failed to understand that "science" includes a body of mind-sets not reflexively consonant with the great tradition of moral education. As one historian of moral education put it, there was a "growing conviction that science alone dealt with an objective world of knowledge... [and] nonscientific subjects were more and more regarded, not as modes of knowing or sources of new knowledge, but as, at best, merely expressions of subjective feelings and preferences, or repositories of folk customs and social habits..." (Sloan, 1980, p. 46).

The character education movement articulated numerous traditional moral aims: promptness, truthfulness, courtesy, and obedience. The movement strove to develop programs in elementary and secondary schools which fostered such conduct. The programs emphasized techniques such as: appropriately structured materials in history and literature; school clubs and other extra-curricular activites; rigorous pupil discipline codes; and daily flag salutes and frequent assemblies. Many relatively elaborate character education "plans" were designed, and put in the schools to advance such ends.

Oftentimes, the plans were adopted through the mandate of state legislatures or local state boards of education.

An Unfavorable Evaluation

From the first, the supporters of character education gave great emphasis on rational organization and research. Despite such attempts, much of the research involved was rather thin. Nonetheless, because of the importance attributed to character, the research persisted, and gradually its quality improved. During the mid-1920's, one group of researchers, led by Hugh Hartschorne and Mark A. May, committed themselves to careful and long-term concern with the topic. Their findings were gradually released in three significant volumes (1928, 1929, 1930). The findings reported the statistical relationship -- or non-relationship -- between character education techniques and various forms of good or bad student conduct. Essentially, their conclusions were perceived as detrimental to the character education approach. To put it in non-statistical terms, they concluded that the relationship between pupil good conduct and the application of character education approaches was slight. Good conduct appeared to be relatively situation specific: a person might routinely act correctly (or incorrectly) in one particular situation, and act "incorrectly" in another situation that was slightly different, e.g., cheat in exams, but not steal money from the class fund. This situational specificity meant that good character was not a unified trait, and that it could not be cultivated by any single approach.

Despite this research, the character education approach was never formally abandoned. And few educators or researchers have ever said, publicly, that schools should not be concerned with the morality or character of their pupils. Indeed, the more recent research (and statistical reanalysis of their

original data) has even contended that Hartschorne and May's findings were excessively negative. Still, their research was a turning point in the relationship between American public education and the great tradition of moral education. Before the research many schools were fully concerend with carrying forward that tradition, and the intellectual forces affecting schools were in sympathy with such efforts. From the early 1930's forward, many schools still reflexively maintained their former commitment to moral education; however, the prevailing intellectual climate, among researchers and academics, was indifferent or hostile to such efforts. In effect, a disjunction gradually arose between what some educators and many parents thought was appropriate, and what was favored by a smaller, better-trained group of experts.

An intriguing irony is that the research findings of Hartschorne and May were not actually in conflict with the major intellectual themes of the great tradition. The tradition always emphasized that moral education was complex. To be effective, such education needed to be incremental, pervasive, persistent and rigorous. Given these principles, it is logical that the measured long-term effect of any limited program of "moral instruction" would be minute. The findings primarily demonstrated that American educators had exaggerated expectations about the effects of formal systems of character education. But any historian of American education would take as given the proposition that Americans usually have exaggerated expectations about what can be produced by <u>any</u> education technique. This does not mean that education's effects are inconsequential; it does signifiy that Americans often approach education from a semi-utopian perspective. We have trouble realizing that many things happen slowly, and that not all problems are solveable.

The reality is that significant moral instruction is the product of systems which immerse students for many years, and which apply strong incentives and pressures. It is true that observers of some primitive societies may attribute strong shaping effects to some apparently brief but demanding occasions -- such as puberty rituals. And there is a tradition in Western literature, which portrays persons as dramatically shaped by critical life incidents. But such perceptions of sharp changes must be weighed with caution. As for the puberty rituals, the length of such rituals is often brief. But participants have actually been preparing for such occasions throughout their entire prior lives; thus, the ritual is the culmination of a long period of conscious and subconscious learning. Likewise, in the case of sudden changes in the lives of characters in novels, usually it can be seen, on a careful reading, that the authors use triggering incidents to explain value transformations which had already been gradually taking place for a multiplicity of reasons. However if they claim that such incidents alone are the source of such persisting transformations, they are flying in the face of accumulated evidence. Of course, to the extent that authors are arguing for the importance of literature they are no doubt correct and represent an important part of the great tradition.

None of this is to say that human beings cannot be morally shaped: the evidence of anthropology and history argues that the babies now being born in America, if transmitted to other environments, could be reared to have the values of cannibals, Sioux Indians, Nazis, or Eskimos. Indeed, there are many authenticated cases of kidnapped children of American colonial settlers being raised by Indians; sometimes, these children chose to remain Indian when they were "set free" late in their socialization as Indians (Van der Beets, 1973). The point is that effective systems for teaching values must be elaborate and

pervasive; they work with immersion. Hartschorne and May's findings did not destroy the legitimacy of concern about moral education; they only demonstrated that science could not provide simple, absolute prescriptions about how to produce morality.

New Models of Moral Education

During the nineteen thirties, forties, and fifties, there was little intellectual or research concern with the topic of moral education in American education. Schools continued to be engaged in moral education, both deliberately or incidentally, but the in school process relied on momentum stimulated by earlier perspectives. In other words, moral education went on, but without substantial intellectual underpinning. As already described above, in the 1960's two new models of moral education made their appearance: Values Clarification (identified with Louis L. Raths and Sidney B. Simon), and the moral development approach (identified with Lawrence Kohlberg and his colleagues). The models had certain common elements: their developers were not school teachers, ministers, or education administrators, but academics -- college professors; furthermore, the developers sought to emphasize the scientific base for their efforts. But, most importantly, the models neglected or disavowed the great tradition's persistent concern with prescribing moral content and affecting conduct. The primary aim of both models was to cause students to feel or reason in particular ways about moral issues or dilemmas. Although the Values Clarification theorists expressed concern for behavior they were not terribly interested in testing whether moral conduct was actually practiced. They were focused on talk, on discussion groups and, like Kohlberg, they used many moral dilemmas that were highly abstract, and would never arise in real life. In reality, the issues

and dilemmas were largely tools for helping students learn appropriate attitudes or techniques for moral analysis.

This failure to show concern for moral behavior is especially disturbing in the case of Kohlberg, who explicitly rejects the approach of the great tradition. He disparages the older approach by calling it the "bag of virtues" school of moral education (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 31-32). In other words he disapproves of education deliberately trying to make pupils honest, kind, or brave. He rejects it because the behavioral evidence for it, as noted, is not strong. But the same test -- namely the ability to effect conduct -- is one he himself will not apply to his own approach. He is only interested in predicting moral reasoning. When it comes to seeing if his stages of moral thought predict behavior, he ducks the very test by which he rejects his competition.

The reasons for the shift from focussing on conduct to modes of reasoning is of interest. The developers of the new models were conscious of Hartschorne and May's research. Thus, they recognized the difficulty of shaping conduct -- and presumably felt that shaping patterns of reasoning was more feasible. Previous research had also disclosed the extreme difficulty of measuring changes in observable conduct (e.g., it is hard to set-up tests to measure frequency of lying among students); but changes in reasoning patterns might be assessed by the application of interviews, or paper and pencil tests. Furthermore, the new models were designed as specific packets of curriculum materials. These could be taught via lectures and in class discussion. Such designs facilitated their adoption by teachers and schools. If the models had aimed to pervasively affect a pupil's day-to-day conduct, it would have been much more difficult to disseminate them to schools. They could not be merchandised in neat packages. Finally, the researchers (and

proponents) of the new models felt it was morally unjustifiable to apply to pupils the vital pressures needed to actually shape human conduct. The application of such pressures would constitute "indoctrination." On the other hand, methods of moral discussion or reasoning might apparently be taught as routine school subjects with the tacit consent of the pupils involved.

The anti-indoctrination stance of the new models is so central as to invite amplification. The word "indoctrination" connotes that teachers, or other significant adults, will cause pupils to learn certain ideas or values -- a doctrine -- without the pupils being permitted to question their validity. Obviously, the great tradition regarded the issue of indoctrination as a specious question. The great tradition says, "Of couse indoctrination happens. It is ridiculous to believe children are capable of objectively assessing many of the beliefs and values they must absorb. They must learn a certain body of 'doctrine,' to function on a day-to-day basis in society. There is good and bad doctrine, and thus things must be weighed and assessed. But such assessment is largely the responsibility of parents and other appropriate adults."

As we have seen the Values Clarification procedure, while claiming not to indoctrinate, was heavily engaged in doing it anyway -- it just wouldn't admit it! It is also true that Kohlberg has explicitly reversed his earlier, anti-indoctrination position (Kohlberg, 1978, p. 14-15). This reversal, was a commendable sign of intellectual flexibility. Unfortunately, it included no significant pragmatic proposals for dealing with what or how to indoctrinate.

It is hard to articulate fairly the position of the anti-indoctrinators. They were against indoctrination. However, they provide no clear answer as to how children are to be given many real values. Thus, children in America will almost inevitably end-up being American adults. They will have to earn money

to live. They will be subject to our civil and criminal laws. They will read American newspapers, see American television, and probably marry other Americans. Throughout all of their lives, they will have to live and work in close proximity with other Americans. The brute facts drastically limit the moral choices open to American children. If they are to survive as adults, 90% of their value options are already predetermined. In such a context, to belittle indoctrination is disingeneous, especially if, as is true, these systems were indoctrinating while claiming they weren't.

The anti-indoctrinators also do not say what adults are to do when childrens' value choices and resulting conduct are clearly harmful to them or others. After all, punishments for bad value choices are, in effect, forms of indoctrination. And the very idea of presenting pupils with any particular approach to moral education in a school is inherently indoctrinative: the pupils are not allowed to refuse to come to school, or to seriously hear the pros and cons of various approaches to moral education articulated by sympathetic spokesmen and freely choose among them. Providing such c..ces is antithetical to the operation of any school for children or adolescents. For instance, none of the pupils taking courses affected by values education are offered (in the same school, and for credit) the option of taking a course "How to be a Catholic," taught by a priest, or "How to be a Jew," taught by a Rabbi. Thus, it is disengenuous, under such circumstances, to talk about student choices. The point is that, <u>on the whole, school is inherently indoctrinative, and should and must be</u>; the only significant question is what the indoctrination is and whether the indoctrination will be overt or covert. But, whatever the ultimate logic of the anti-indoctrinators, it is still fair to say that their public posture was that indoctrination (whatever the word means) is bad, and that their techniques allegedly do not indoctrinate. That

much comes through clearly. One effect of this posture has been to further devalue the great tradition, which was always comparatively straightforward about its pro-indoctrination position.

Conclusion: The Great Tradition Revisited

The two models recently proposed as replacements for the great tradition are clearly inadequate. As a result we must reconsider the previously rejected but long persisting great tradition model. This reconsideration will not surprise some practicing educators -- who have continued to apply the older model in their schools while disregarding its faddish competitors. However, a reconsideration will hearten these stalwart traditionalists, encourage others to change their incorrect practices, and subject the model to constructive criticism and analysis. Indeed, there are already signs that an intellectual reconsideration is under way (see Coles 1981; Grant, 1981; Sizer, 1984; Wilson, 1983; Wynne, 1977).

Thus, as American education revives its concern for the other basic disciplines (e.g. language, history, science, mathematics) it is reasonable to expect a similar revival in moral education. Such a return to the direct and indirect teaching of morality, as in The Great Tradition, is not some new educational movement or gimmick. It is in effect, a return to intellectual sobriety and the wisdom of experience. Furthermore, it is a recognition that even though the old ways are the best with regard to transmitting morality, they still are far from a cure-all. There is no simple educational "fix" for the country's moral problems. Finally, after the recent decades of hubris and relative irresponsibility we educators must practice certain virtues ourselves, especially in the face of our enormous challenges, the virtues of humility and responsibility.

Footnote

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[2]For reasons that are not clear, in their very popular book Values Clarification (1978), Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum propose a different order: prizing, then choosing, then acting. There is little attention paid to what the students' initial values are or where they came from, since the first emphasis is on prizing their already existing values. Nor is there concern with whether the values of these young students are worth prizing. (That would obviously raise the bête noire of objective values.) As a result these authors do not provide even a moderate encouragement for serious rational reflection about what is right or wrong, or what the consequences of an action might be. Instead, for these prominent Values Clarification theorists (Simon et al.) the process begins with the irrational, emotional prizing of whatever students already happen to have as values or goals and the secondary purpose of evaluation of consequences is overshadowed by the initial prizing and by the emphasis on self-acceptance.

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